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Public housing development has been a critical part of the social welfare system in 
China since the economic reform in 1978. This paper examines China’s contemporary 
public housing development and attempts to understand the critical factors that affect 
its provision structure, which has made the current implementation of public housing 
programs contentious. More specifically, it examines China’s political and fiscal structures 
as well as its land system in relation to its public housing implementation and seeks 
to uncover why the land parcels allocated to public housing projects are mostly located 
along the urban fringe. This research has identified three major factors that have led 
local governments to locate public housing projects mostly in the suburbs: the inter-
governmental system, fiscal burdens in the local implementation process, and political 
risks that local governments would face in the provision of land. Local governments 
have taken advantage of the decentralized authority of policy implementation by locating 
public housing projects in less-developed suburban areas in order to minimize their fiscal 
burdens and political risks.
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Tiantongyuan and Huilongguan are two mega public housing projects that were 
built in Beijing, China in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s and house a population of over 
800,000. Setting a record in November 2013, 
more than 20,000 commuters flooded the 
subway stations in the north Tiantongyuan-
Huilongguan area in just two hours.1 
Researchers from Capital Normal University 
and Beijing Union University conducted 
a joint survey on the issue of job-housing 
imbalance in 2012 and found that people who 
live in public housing communities have, 
on average, the longest commuting time 
and distance.2 China is at a critical stage 
in re-evaluating its development of public 
housing, an essential tool in restructuring 
its welfare system that would allow for the 
creation of decent homes for its growing 
population in the next decade. The local 
implementation of public housing programs 
remains contentious and unsatisfactory in 
spite of the strong political will expressed by 
the central government.3 There are two main 
“unintended consequences” related to public 
housing programs: one is that there is an 
insufficient supply of public housing units; 
the other is that public housing projects are 
always located in relatively disadvantaged 
places such as the urban fringe, where there 
is a lack of adequate access to employment 
opportunities and public services.4 Although 
the provision of public housing is generally 
considered an important policy step, and 
governments have invested a huge amount 
of money to build public housing units, public 
satisfaction with public housing is lower than 
the government’s expectation. 
This paper focuses on understanding what 
shapes China’s public housing development 
in order to uncover the barriers impeding 
local implementation and the factors that 
lead to unintended consequences. First, this 
paper examines the historical development 
of public housing policy in China. The second 
section explores how China’s political and 
fiscal structures, as well as its land system, 
have shaped the current public housing 
provision structure, and then elaborates 
on the critical factors that have deeply 
influenced its provisioning and site selection 
processes. This research aims to help city 
planners and policymakers think about how 
to integrate public housing development in 
future city development.  
HISTORY OF CHINA’S PUBLIC 
HOUSING DEVELOPMENT
China’s public housing development has 
experienced three phases after the economic 
reform in 1978. From 1979 to 1998, the 
welfare housing system maintained the 
legacy of communist public housing policies 
from the Mao period. From 1998 to 2007, the 
Central Government launched the modern 
public housing system. From 2007 to present, 
public housing development has rapidly 
expanded.
Before the 1980s, under the in-kind socialist 
housing distribution scheme, China did 
not have a private housing market. In 
1981, over 82 percent of urban housing 
was publicly owned and was built by 
state-owned enterprises or other state 
organizations.5 Work units allocated housing 
to their employees as a kind of welfare; 
low rent compensated low wages. This 
welfare housing system, however, was an 
impediment to economic growth.6 During 
the 1980s and 1990s, China enacted urban 
housing privatization reform through which 
housing units were sold to sitting tenants at 
a discount.7 In the 1990s, China’s housing 
provision system shifted towards being 
more market-oriented, which aided the 
revitalization of the Chinese urban economy.
 
In 1998, the central government issued 
A Notification from the State Council on 
Further Deepening the Reform of the Urban 
Housing System and Accelerating Housing 
Construction, which terminated the welfare-
housing provision and introduced a two-tier 
public housing system consisting of Cheap 
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Rental Housing (CRH) and Economic and 
Comfortable Housing (ECH).8 The former 
was rental-oriented, in the form of heavily 
subsidized social welfare targeting low-
income households, whereas the latter was 
homeownership-oriented, and provided 
incentives for developers to construct low-
cost housing that would be sold to low- to 
middle-income households at government-
controlled prices. ECH was designated as 
the predominant form of housing provision 
in this housing reform (SC[1998]No.23). The 
intention was, on the one hand, to increase 
home ownership and promote housing 
commodification and marketization and, 
on the other hand, to stimulate domestic 
consumption in response to the Asian 
financial crisis.9 Nevertheless, the interest 
in public housing development rapidly 
waned after the 1998 housing reform; the 
national focus shifted towards economic 
growth, leading to a real estate boom.10 In 
2003, the State Council officially terminated 
the designation of ECH as the main form of 
housing provision (SC[2003]No.18), and since 
then the role of public housing has been 
downgraded dramatically. The post-reform 
housing provision emphasized the role of 
housing in economic development while 
overlooking the housing needs of low- and 
low-to-middle-income households, leading to 
a rapid increase in housing prices.
Within a short period of time, housing 
affordability became a pressing social issue 
resulting in tremendous social discontent. 
Under strong social and political pressures, 
in 2007 the central government brought 
public housing programs back on the agenda 
and committed to meeting the basic housing 
needs of low-income households through 
a revival and expansion of public housing 
programs (SC[2007]No.24).11 Since then, 
China has established a comprehensive 
public housing system, and public housing 
development has experienced a ‘Great 
Leap Forward.’ In order to counteract the 
negative shocks of the global financial crisis 
in 2008, China released a plan to construct 
7.47 million public housing units across the 
country (SCGO[2008]No.131) as a key part 
of the four trillion RMB economic stimulus 
package.12 In 2010, China’s 12th Five-Year 
Plan officially included public housing as a 
critical component of its social welfare and 
public service system.13 In 2011, the Premier 
announced the plan to construct 36 million 
public housing units between 2011 and 2015, 
aiming to accommodate one-fifth of the 
Chinese urban population.14 Nonetheless, 
China is still experiencing rocketing housing 
prices. For example, the national-level 
mean housing price soared from 3576 RMB 
per square meter in 2008 to 7203 RMB per 
square meter in 2016.15 Chinese President 
Xi Jinping, in his speech at the 10th collective 
learning meeting of the Central Politburo of 
the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2013, 
described the evolution of public housing 
policy as “the inevitable requirement to 
promote social justice and ensure the public 
sharing the achievements of reform and 
development.”16
INTER-GOVERNMENT 
STRUCTURE AND PUBLIC 
HOUSING DEVELOPMENT
In order to understand the structure of the 
current public housing system in China, it 
is necessary to examine China’s political 
structure, fiscal structure, and land system, 
which have all played a role in public housing 
implementation. It is then possible to draw 
the general framework of China’s public 
housing provision system and determine the 
three major factors that influence China’s 
public housing development, as well as 
understand how national policy design has 
shaped the local implementation of public 
housing programs, including spatial patterns 
of public housing development.
Pol i t ical  Structure
China’s political structure mixes elements 
of both centralization and decentralization. 
The Chinese government has five levels: 
central, provincial, prefectural, county, 
and township. The latter four are referred 
to as “local governments.”17 According to 
Xu, China’s inter-governmental system 
is a “regional decentralized authoritarian 
system […] characterized as a combination 
of political centralization and economic 
regional decentralization.”18 Under this 
system, the central government has the 
authority to mandate and instruct lower-
level governments, yet at the same time 
lower-level governments have the ability 
to impact national economic and political 
development.19 
 
China’s political regime is characterized 
by rigorous personnel controls, which hold 
local officials liable for failing to fulfill top-
down political mandates.20 Local officials 
are annually evaluated by higher-level 
officials based on their political performance. 
Therefore, local officials have a strong 
political incentive to promote economic 
growth, which is the main evaluation criterion 
for their promotion or dismissal.21 However, 
the Central Government also assigns annual 
and long-term public housing construction 
tasks for local officials as another evaluation 
criterion, expecting that public housing 
programs will contribute to housing 
affordability and alleviate public discontent.22 
A conflict thus arises for local governments, 
which are expected to provide sufficient 
public housing, often at the expense of 
economic growth.
Fiscal  Structure
Before 1978, China had a highly centralized 
fiscal system. The Central Government 
collected and allocated all revenue. 
From 1979 to 1993, fiscal power and 
responsibilities were decentralized to 
local governments, giving priority to local 
economic growth and signaling their 
expectation of an efficient allocation of 
public resources.23 This move helped China’s 
economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s 
but led to a sharp decline in the central 
government’s revenue and administrative 
powers. To strengthen its fiscal and political 
position, the Central Government enacted a 
tax reform in 1994.24 Under this tax reform, 
the Central Government was able to collect 
increased tax revenue through a value-
added tax, business tax, and enterprise 
tax. While local governments still had 
the same spending responsibilities (e.g., 
public services, public housing provision, 
etc.), their share of tax revenue shrank. As 
compensation, the Central Government 
allowed them to have “some extra-budgetary 
revenue” (primarily the land-leasing revenue) 
to finance local expenditures.25 The land-
leasing revenue, which is positively correlated 
with local economic development, has 
become the primary revenue source for local 
governments. Therefore, local governments 
are incentivized to finance infrastructure, 
which effectively attracts investments and 
promotes the local economy, and favors 
allocating land towards more profitable 
uses such as market-based housing or 
commercial development. This land use 
decision generates more tax revenue than 
financing and allocating land to public 
housing projects.26
Under this fiscal structure, public housing 
programs have imposed heavy fiscal burdens 
on local governments. First, the Central 
Government mandates local governments 
complete assigned quotas of public housing 
construction, but only contributes a small 
part of the cost. For example, in 2011 the 
Central Government planned to develop 
ten million public housing units but only 
budgeted for eight percent of the required 
investment, leaving local governments to 
shoulder the rest of the cost.27 Second, 
current public housing policy design 
emphasizes free land allocation and other 
financial incentives for developers, which 
makes local governments give up part 
of their revenue from land-leasing and 
administrative fees.28
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Some innovative strategies have been 
employed to alleviate fiscal burdens for 
local governments in public housing 
development, including utilizing manifold 
funding sources (e.g., bonds, trust funds, 
etc.) and encouraging investments from 
private capital.29 Moreover, local governments 
have called for developers to participate and 
share the fiscal burden. Advantageously, 
professional developers are experienced 
at reducing construction costs while 
guaranteeing high construction quality, and 
this system provides an opportunity for the 
leading developers to demonstrate their 
social responsibility.30
Land System 
China maintains the socialist legacy of the 
urban/rural dual-track land system, in 
which the state owns urban land and the 
village collectives own rural land.31 During 
the Maoist period, the Central Government 
adhered to the national plans of production 
and urban planning when making every 
urban land use decision.32 Before the 1980s, 
urban land was largely free, allocated 
to various danwei (work units) by the 
government. Since the 1980s, urban land use 
reform has ushered in a nationwide market-
based orientation, which has privatized urban 
land use rights and has created a land use 
system requiring payment on the basis of 
land value and other market factors. This 
has given rise to different types of land and 
real estate markets.33 Whereas the rural land 
has always been collectively owned, after 
the 1980s the Central Government released 
a new household responsibility system that 
privatized land use rights for individual 
households. Ever since, the village collectives 
started to function like contractors, sub-
contracting their land to village households. 
The village households have then been able 
to keep all the income that they gained from 
their land after they paid taxes to the village 
collectives.34 This wave of privatization in 
both urban and rural land use rights led to 
significant economic and agricultural growth 
in the 1980s.
China has a strict quota on the conversion 
of agricultural land into urban development 
to ensure its food security. Therefore, while 
the urban population is rapidly growing, 
there is a decreasing supply of land devoted 
to urban development.35 Local governments 
need to acquire land from both the state and 
the village collectives and then lease it to 
manufacturers or developers to collect land-
leasing fees to finance local expenditures. 
State-owned land can be leased directly, 
whereas China’s constitution mandates that 
converting rural land uses into urban land 
uses must go through a state requisition 
process before leasing.36 In theory, the law 
decrees that collective-owned land cannot 
be leased for real estate use; however, 
in practice, many villages have directly 
leased out their collective land for housing 
development at discounted prices. This kind 
of housing, called “property rights-limited 
housing,” is theoretically illegal and carries 
no property rights.37 Until recently, the 
Central Government suggested that local 
governments could rent collective-owned 
land to develop Public Rental Housing (PRH). 
In 2017, the Ministry of Land and Resources 
(MLR) and the Ministry of Housing Urban-
Rural Development (MOHURD) issued 
the “Pilot Scheme for the Construction 
of Rental Housing Using Collective 
Construction Land,” allowing for 13 cities 
in China, including Beijing, to develop PRH 
projects on collective-owned land.38 Since 
implementation, Beijing has started plans 
to allot 1,000 hectares of rural collective 
land designated for PRH construction by 
2021.39 This pilot reform would become one 
of the most important policy innovations 
in public housing development. As experts 
have suggested, it will help solve the 
housing problem for floating populations 
and “improve the economic and social 
environment in suburbs.”40
Factors in Publ ic  Housing 
Provision and Site Select ion
Three factors have affected the 
provisioning and site designation for 
public housing projects in China. First, the 
inter-governmental system tasks local 
governments with implementing public 
housing programs. The current structure of 
public housing provisioning in China has both 
a hierarchical and a top-down framework, 
“with relevant government departments 
at different levels divided by policy and 
implementation responsibilities.”41 The 
Central Government not only formulates 
general policy and strategy but also assigns 
and mandates local governments to meet 
the public housing construction targets given 
to each province. Under this mandatory 
command, local officials face administrative 
punishments if they fail to meet the quota 
(SCGO[2010]No.4; SCGO[2011]No.45). 
This performance evaluation system over-
emphasizes the quantity (total number of 
units) of housing construction, while ignoring 
other critical aspects such as construction 
quality, location, and accessibility. Since 
the Central Government has not provided 
a comprehensive and detailed regulatory 
framework, local governments have the 
freedom to design their own public housing 
provision structures. Consequently, this 
‘decentralized policy implementation’ has 
empowered local governments to implement 
public housing programs that advance their 
local political agendas.42 For example, local 
governments are more likely to allocate 
public housing as a subsidized benefit 
to specifically target groups they want to 
attract and retain, such as highly-educated 
individuals and skilled labors.43 Furthermore, 
it is reasonable for local governments to build 
public housing projects in less-developed 
suburban areas so that they can reduce their 
revenue losses while leasing expensive land 
in the urban core for other developments to 
maintain economic growth. As a result, this 
inter-governmental system plays a key role 
in the less desirable placement of public 
housing projects across cities in China.
Second, there are serious fiscal burdens 
placed on local governments’ shoulders, 
including the opportunity costs from the lost 
land lease revenues and land requisition 
costs that occur during the implementation 
of public housing programs, both of which 
significantly impact public housing provision 
and site selection. Based on the current 
public housing provision system in China, 
local governments have to take up the 
majority of responsibilities for public housing 
development, such as land supply, facility 
management, provision of infrastructure, and 
maintenance.44 This bundle of responsibilities 
has imposed heavy fiscal burdens on local 
governments. Local governments are less 
willing to place public housing projects in the 
urban areas, where the land in those areas 
could contribute a considerable amount of 
revenue from land-leasing fees, and are 
more likely to place them along the urban 
fringe where the land is much cheaper, in an 
attempt to minimize their land-based revenue 
losses.45 Moreover, the fiscal burdens also 
include financial or administrative costs 
incurred during the land acquisition process. 
If the site were in the urban core, it would 
likely have a higher density and would cost 
more to be demolished, requiring higher 
resident relocation compensation. Thus, local 
governments tend to avoid well-developed 
sites because of the concerns over land 
acquisition costs. 
The political risks that local governments 
face in land provisioning is the third factor 
that influences public housing development. 
Because of the urban/rural dual-track land 
system, local governments face different 
kinds of political risks when providing urban 
or rural land for public housing projects. 
Even though local governments can lease 
state-owned urban land directly to public 
housing developers without political concern, 
they are still responsible for acquiring the 
land from the original property owners. In 
many cases, urban land acquisition involves a 
long and complicated process of negotiation 
with sitting tenants about demolition or 
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land value and other market factors. This 
has given rise to different types of land and 
real estate markets.33 Whereas the rural land 
has always been collectively owned, after 
the 1980s the Central Government released 
a new household responsibility system that 
privatized land use rights for individual 
households. Ever since, the village collectives 
started to function like contractors, sub-
contracting their land to village households. 
The village households have then been able 
to keep all the income that they gained from 
their land after they paid taxes to the village 
collectives.34 This wave of privatization in 
both urban and rural land use rights led to 
significant economic and agricultural growth 
in the 1980s.
China has a strict quota on the conversion 
of agricultural land into urban development 
to ensure its food security. Therefore, while 
the urban population is rapidly growing, 
there is a decreasing supply of land devoted 
to urban development.35 Local governments 
need to acquire land from both the state and 
the village collectives and then lease it to 
manufacturers or developers to collect land-
leasing fees to finance local expenditures. 
State-owned land can be leased directly, 
whereas China’s constitution mandates that 
converting rural land uses into urban land 
uses must go through a state requisition 
process before leasing.36 In theory, the law 
decrees that collective-owned land cannot 
be leased for real estate use; however, 
in practice, many villages have directly 
leased out their collective land for housing 
development at discounted prices. This kind 
of housing, called “property rights-limited 
housing,” is theoretically illegal and carries 
no property rights.37 Until recently, the 
Central Government suggested that local 
governments could rent collective-owned 
land to develop Public Rental Housing (PRH). 
In 2017, the Ministry of Land and Resources 
(MLR) and the Ministry of Housing Urban-
Rural Development (MOHURD) issued 
the “Pilot Scheme for the Construction 
of Rental Housing Using Collective 
Construction Land,” allowing for 13 cities 
in China, including Beijing, to develop PRH 
projects on collective-owned land.38 Since 
implementation, Beijing has started plans 
to allot 1,000 hectares of rural collective 
land designated for PRH construction by 
2021.39 This pilot reform would become one 
of the most important policy innovations 
in public housing development. As experts 
have suggested, it will help solve the 
housing problem for floating populations 
and “improve the economic and social 
environment in suburbs.”40
Factors in Publ ic  Housing 
Provision and Site Select ion
Three factors have affected the 
provisioning and site designation for 
public housing projects in China. First, the 
inter-governmental system tasks local 
governments with implementing public 
housing programs. The current structure of 
public housing provisioning in China has both 
a hierarchical and a top-down framework, 
“with relevant government departments 
at different levels divided by policy and 
implementation responsibilities.”41 The 
Central Government not only formulates 
general policy and strategy but also assigns 
and mandates local governments to meet 
the public housing construction targets given 
to each province. Under this mandatory 
command, local officials face administrative 
punishments if they fail to meet the quota 
(SCGO[2010]No.4; SCGO[2011]No.45). 
This performance evaluation system over-
emphasizes the quantity (total number of 
units) of housing construction, while ignoring 
other critical aspects such as construction 
quality, location, and accessibility. Since 
the Central Government has not provided 
a comprehensive and detailed regulatory 
framework, local governments have the 
freedom to design their own public housing 
provision structures. Consequently, this 
‘decentralized policy implementation’ has 
empowered local governments to implement 
public housing programs that advance their 
local political agendas.42 For example, local 
governments are more likely to allocate 
public housing as a subsidized benefit 
to specifically target groups they want to 
attract and retain, such as highly-educated 
individuals and skilled labors.43 Furthermore, 
it is reasonable for local governments to build 
public housing projects in less-developed 
suburban areas so that they can reduce their 
revenue losses while leasing expensive land 
in the urban core for other developments to 
maintain economic growth. As a result, this 
inter-governmental system plays a key role 
in the less desirable placement of public 
housing projects across cities in China.
Second, there are serious fiscal burdens 
placed on local governments’ shoulders, 
including the opportunity costs from the lost 
land lease revenues and land requisition 
costs that occur during the implementation 
of public housing programs, both of which 
significantly impact public housing provision 
and site selection. Based on the current 
public housing provision system in China, 
local governments have to take up the 
majority of responsibilities for public housing 
development, such as land supply, facility 
management, provision of infrastructure, and 
maintenance.44 This bundle of responsibilities 
has imposed heavy fiscal burdens on local 
governments. Local governments are less 
willing to place public housing projects in the 
urban areas, where the land in those areas 
could contribute a considerable amount of 
revenue from land-leasing fees, and are 
more likely to place them along the urban 
fringe where the land is much cheaper, in an 
attempt to minimize their land-based revenue 
losses.45 Moreover, the fiscal burdens also 
include financial or administrative costs 
incurred during the land acquisition process. 
If the site were in the urban core, it would 
likely have a higher density and would cost 
more to be demolished, requiring higher 
resident relocation compensation. Thus, local 
governments tend to avoid well-developed 
sites because of the concerns over land 
acquisition costs. 
The political risks that local governments 
face in land provisioning is the third factor 
that influences public housing development. 
Because of the urban/rural dual-track land 
system, local governments face different 
kinds of political risks when providing urban 
or rural land for public housing projects. 
Even though local governments can lease 
state-owned urban land directly to public 
housing developers without political concern, 
they are still responsible for acquiring the 
land from the original property owners. In 
many cases, urban land acquisition involves a 
long and complicated process of negotiation 
with sitting tenants about demolition or 
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relocation, which places tremendous political 
and fiscal pressure on local governments if 
tenants refuse to be relocated or demand 
exorbitant compensation.46 The village 
collectives, however, are striving to find ways 
to generate income. They are more willing 
to lease out their collective land in order 
to obtain long-term and stable benefits. 
Therefore, local governments face less 
resistance and lower political risks in rural 
land acquisition, which also means lower 
fiscal pressure. The recent pilot reform of 
the land system allowing PRH to be built 
on collective-owned land will further lower 
the political risks when allocating collective 
land to public housing projects. As a result, 
local governments would prefer developing 
public housing in the suburbs of collective 
land rather than in the urban core, after 
they weigh the political risks involved when 
implementing public housing programs in 
each situation. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RESEARCH 
IMPLICATIONS 
Providing enough quality public housing is 
one of the main targets of current housing 
policies in China. China’s recent history 
has demonstrated that, when constructing 
a large amount of public housing, it was 
effective in absorbing surplus capital 
and labor, which stimulated domestic 
consumption and thereby counteracted the 
negative shock of financial crisis. As cities 
in China experience rapid urbanization, a 
housing affordability crisis has led to social 
instabilities. Under social and political 
pressure, the timely supply of a sufficient 
number of public housing units has been 
the key concern for the local and central 
governments.47 Viewed more broadly, public 
housing development could be considered 
instrumental in promoting urbanization and 
sustainable urban development, and a tool 
that local governments could use to facilitate 
other policy initiatives.
Because of the inter-governmental system, 
fiscal burden, and political risk, local 
governments are reluctant to allocate more 
profitable and expensive land parcels in 
urban areas to public housing projects. Local 
governments take advantage of the system of 
decentralized authority when implementing 
public housing projects in order to minimize 
their fiscal burden and political risk: they 
simply locate public housing projects in 
less-developed suburban areas where land is 
much cheaper and easier to acquire. 
The fact that large-scale public housing 
projects have brought large populations as 
well as public services and facilities to the 
urban fringe in conjunction with China’s 
rapid urbanization needs to be further 
explored. It is important to examine how 
these mega-communities contribute to 
China’s suburbanization. For example, 
Tiantongyuan was one of the largest planned 
public housing projects when it started 
in 1998, projecting to house over 180,000 
people – a similar population size to that of 
a large county. There was no subway service 
connecting Tiantongyuan with the central 
city until 2007.48 Since then, this suburban 
area has experienced a period of rapid 
growth, which undoubtedly has accelerated 
the development of infrastructure systems 
and other public services, and made land 
parcels more attractive to developers. The 
increased demand for land raised property 
prices in this suburban area, which has 
pushed new public housing projects to 
locate even further towards outer suburbs. 
Therefore, future studies should examine 
the relationship between public housing 
development and China’s urban expansion 
and suburbanization, which happens at 
the outer edge of urban development in a 
much broader and continuous process, and 
how public housing developments can be 
integrated into the city for the future. Weican Zuo is a first-year doctoral student in architecture. She received her Bachelor of 
Architecture from Xi’an Jiaotong University, China and Master of Architecture from University 
of Minnesota. Studying the dynamics of forces that are critical in framing contemporary models 
of public housing in China, as well as China’s urbanization and sustainable urban development 
are important topics that she is interested in exploring during her doctoral studies. 
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